This paper reviews water policy responses to drought in Australia, focusing on the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) during the two decades from 1997. This period, which includes the decade long Millennium drought, brought a much sharper focus to discussions of scarcity and value of water. The drought initially focused attention on rising salinity and environmental water availability, as action on both was supported by strong science, and resonated politically. The drought became a crisis in 2006. Short-term planning focused on ensuring communities did not run out of water. For the longer term, the national government responded by announcing a major package of reform measures addressing sustainability and underlying scarcity, and recognising climate change. The package strengthened MDB water market infrastructure, upgraded water resource planning and the ability of irrigators to manage their water assets more flexibly, established new sustainable diversion limits and provided funding to ensure the environment received a larger share of basin water resources. But its completeness as a package can be attributed not only to the severity of drought, but also to political leadership, a disrupting strategy in the form of national legislation and a strong national budget that provided financial resources. The drought provided a crisis, but other ingredients were necessary to ensure effective action.
Introduction
There is no universal definition of drought but there is also no debate that drought is an integral part of the Australian landscape (Botterill, 2003; Bond et al., 2008; Khan, 2008; Connor & Kaczan, 2013; Bureau of Meteorology, 2016a ; National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2016) . In this paper we adopt the approach that drought constitutes a prolonged dry period where the available water is insufficient to meet the region's usual use. Droughts are thus much more than a rainfall insufficiency, but go to how a society manages the overall demand and supply of water in a particular region.
In Australia governments have sought to insulate communities where possible from its highly variable climate, initially through construction of large water storages. Australia has the world's highest per capita water storage capacity of any country (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2010). Water policy, through dam construction, management of storages, regulations and licences structuring access to available water, provided a set of tools to ameliorate some of the impacts of drought for those users where water policy could affect access to water.
This paper reviews water policy responses to drought in Australia, focusing on the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) during the two decades from 1997, a period that includes the Millennium drought (Bond et al., 2008; Chiew et al., 2011; van Dijk et al., 2013) . The year 1997 marks the permanent introduction of a cap on surface water diversions in the MDB, or the beginning of the period where water scarcity at some level was recognised as a permanent feature of the landscape, and not just a feature of droughts.
Water policy in the MDB focuses on three major user groups: irrigation businesses (the dominant user group); urban users; and the environment.
A key point to note at the outset is that the focus of water policy is to manage water availability, use and quality. Dry land agriculture in the MDB, where water policy has only a modest impact, accounts for over 60% of the gross value of agricultural product in the Basin. Irrigated agriculture, where water policy has a significant impact, by contrast accounts for around 37% of the gross value of agricultural product, but it occupies only 1% of agricultural land.
Water policy has been but one area affecting risks and input costs facing rural Australia, in the MDB and elsewhere. Exchange rates, commodity prices and changes in demand for products have been additional and sometimes more important factors (Mallawaarachchi & Foster, 2009; Horne, 2014; Ashton & Oliver, 2015) . Moreover, during periods of drought, drought policy per se has played a role in how on-farm decisions have been managed (Botterill, 2003; Botterill & Cockfield, 2013 ; Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, 2016) .
The paper is structured as follows. First, the paper reviews key historical developments in water policy in the MDB prior to the period under consideration, to provide some understanding of the state of water policy as at the mid-1990s. Second, the paper examines water policy developments during the period under consideration and the role played by drought (Howard, 2007a; Wittwer, 2011; Horne, 2013b; Gale et al., 2014; Loch & Adamson, 2015) . Finally, the paper draws some conclusions from the Australian experience.
Setting the stage for scarcity
Water use in the MDB for most of the 1900s was largely determined by state government policy, within a federal constitutional structure. From 1915 a series of intergovernmental agreements between the national government and the states of New South Wales (NSW), Victoria and South Australia played a role in managing water use in the southern part of the basin (Connell et al., 2005; Wheeler, 2014; Guest, forthcoming) . In the late 1980s the adequacy of the traditional management approaches had come under increasing challenge. New institutional arrangements were put in place, with the formation of the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) (formed by Ministers of the national government and the three state governments involved in basin governance (NSW, Victoria and South Australia)) and the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC). In addition to overseeing surface water diversions, the new MDBC was given a remit to be more actively involved in areas of natural resource management of common interest, such as salinity (Brett, 1990; Powell, 1994; Stevenson, 1996) .
Australian governments had come to realise that the push for further economic development was adversely affecting the ecological health of key catchments, including problems caused by increasing salinity and loss of ecosystem values (Emmery, 1994; Williams, 1995; Stevenson, 1996) . There was also a widely held view within government, in the context of a broader nationwide debate on microeconomic reform (including national competition policy), that economic output could be boosted with a more efficient water management regime without increasing water use (COAG, 1994; COAG Working Group on Water Resource Policy, 1994) . In 1994 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed in principle that statutory surface water rights from land rights should be separated. This process of unbundling of water rights from land started the development of water markets as we know them today, but it was to be a long convoluted process (Grafton & Horne, 2014) . Fledgling trading of seasonal or allocation water within irrigation districts, particularly in periods of drought, had been going on for decades (Alvarez et al., 1989) , and small volumes of allocation water trading (water that is credited annually to owners of water entitlements) was taking place regularly in the early 1990s. But the substantial benefits from a much broader fully functioning market had not yet been realised.
As water scarcity became more apparent, both environmental and efficiency issues became central policy concerns in the MDB. In 1991, the MDBMC agreed a salinity management strategy, to ensure the health of the River Murray for both agriculture and environment alike. By 1995, the MDBMC (with the addition of Queensland, which had now joined) had determined that an interim cap should be placed on surface water diversions, in an attempt to arrest the decline in the environmental health in the MDB, and in an attempt to bolster water security for irrigators (MDBC, 1995; Scanlon, 2002; Martin, 2005) . The member state governments had long imposed a moratorium on the issue of new surface water licences, meaning that new access to water could only occur through transfer of an existing entitlement. NSW also privatised its irrigation districts in the southern MDB in 1995, starting a long process of putting irrigation infrastructure operators onto a commercial footing.
The climate-adjusted cap on surface diversions in the MDB did not seek to achieve sustainable ecosystem outcomes (Cox & Baxter, 1996; MDBC, 2004) . It was, instead, a first step to constrain growth in surface water extractions but not development, if that could be achieved, by increasing efficiency of water use and trade. Essentially, the cap determined the maximum quantity of water a state should allow to be diverted in a particular year. How much water would be provided to urban users, irrigators and the environment was a decision for each state (MDBC, 1999) . Each state had its own classes of entitlements, with different rules around how much water would be allocated to each entitlement class each year. Unused water allocations could not be held in the dam and carried over to the following water year as a matter of course. Water management was at this point largely a state-by-state matter. Prior to 1997 there were only two occasions when NSW Murray irrigators received less than 100% allocation on their entitlement (in 1982-83 and 1994-95) . In parallel to basin-wide developments, individual states were introducing reforms of their own to implement their 1994 COAG commitments. The cap applied to the whole basin, requiring its acceptance by Queensland. Queensland was reluctant to agree immediately as it sought expansion in some of its fledgling irrigation districts -it wanted to be allowed to catch up with southern states.
Water policy directed at the MDB by both the national and state governments up to the late 1990s can be characterised as a mechanism promoting ongoing irrigation development and longevity, by enhancing water security to existing entitlement holders (mainly irrigators), while attempting to arrest the ongoing decline in environmental outcomes. While there was an increase in scientific study and much talk about sustainable outcomes, the era of putting in place policies to achieve those outcomes had yet to arrive.
Policy responses to the Millennium drought 1997-2009
Figure 1 provides an overview of rainfall for the periods 1997-2001, 2001-09 and 1997-2009 . Figure 2 provides aggregate cap details while Table 1 provides some examples of allocations to entitlements in key valleys in the southern part of the Basin.
The data describe a lengthy, extraordinarily dry period over much of the Basin, although the most pronounced water availability shortfall was in the southern MDB. Taken together the data illustrate a number of broad points:
• Rainfall declines of 11% in the southern MDB translated into inflow declines of around 35%. In the far south of the Basin, both figures were higher (Chiew et al., 2011) .
• Diversions for the basin as a whole ratcheted down from 2000-01, with widespread impacts on water allocations from the 2002-03 water year. Up to that point trendline use had grown slightly during the previous decade.
• Impacts were felt unevenly between valleys, entitlement types and therefore crops: ○ Victoria's conservative approach to water allocation reflected its higher proportion of perennial crops and dairying -its focus was on ensuring high security entitlements received full allocation in most years. ○ NSW's approach reflected more opportunistic annual crops -its general security Murrumbidgee entitlements illustrated the greater variability in allocation. ○ Up until 2006-07 allocations to South Australian irrigators had been largely unaffected by lower Basin inflows and declines in storage levels, although the impact was already being felt in lower water levels of the Lower Lakes, at the end of the system.
1997-2001: implementing the cap and considering its shortcomings
In the years immediately following the 1995 MDBMC agreement to put the cap in place permanently, governments and the MDBC were very focused on practical implementation of policy and explaining its detail to the irrigation community, alongside continuing implementation of the 1994 COAG water reforms to achieve full cost recovery for provision of rural water services, greater access to water trading and broader programmes such as salinity management (MDBC, 1999; Quiggin, 2000; Martin, 2005; National Water Commission, 2011; Guest, forthcoming) . The 2000 review of the operation of the cap confirmed the importance of the cap, but noted there was no certainty that the cap itself was sustainable (Cox & Baxter, 1996; MDBMC, 2000) . A 2001 independent scientific review questioned whether existing approaches to water management would achieve sustainable environmental outcomes ( Jones et al., 2002) . It was clear to all involved that despite the significance of the cap in the evolution of water management, much more needed to be done to put Basin water management onto a sustainable path (MDBMC, 2001a; Connell, 2007; Quiggin, 2007) . The early period of the Millennium drought (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) was not as severe as the extreme drought that was to follow, but water scarcity was being felt in allocation decisions in some valleys. Coming directly after the introduction of the cap, it was a period when the scientific community was questioning the adequacy of action in the Basin (Cox & Baxter, 1996; Blackmore, 2002; Jones et al., 2002; Arthington & Pusey, 2003) . At the same time, implementation of the COAG reforms was proceeding. For example, from 2000 NSW moved to put in place valley-by-valley water sharing plans under new legislation and increased cost recovery for water services (Martin, 2005) . Much of its water management was preoccupied with implementing unfinished reforms, and considering their adequacy. The pressure from the drought underscored that the new cap was just a starting point, paving the way for two significant basin-wide initiatives.
Salinity and the 10-year Basin Salinity Management Strategy
Salinity issues became a renewed focus of attention, off the back of a 1999 basin salinity audit that concluded vast tracts of land would be unusable in the absence of concerted intervention, with salt damage estimated to cost around AUD$1 billion (10 9 ) per year (MDBMC, 2015) . Action came through a Basin Salinity Management Strategy (MDBMC, 2001b (MDBMC, , 2015 and as a part of the National Plan on Water Quality and Salinity (COAG, 2001; Pannell & Roberts, 2010) , which was designed to address salinity in the worst affected Australian landscapes. Rather than being caused by drought, it was more a reflection of land and water use patterns, but together these national and basin-wide responses can be seen as reflecting drought and pressure on water resources more broadly, and pressure on governments to do something about it. At a very regional scale, the ongoing drought was seen in 2002 as a serious threat to environmental outcomes in the Coorong (Manning, nd) . At a political level, the salinity strategy was sufficiently practical and anchored in the traditional agricultural base to be supported. It would turn out to be a very successful joint government intervention (Doolan et al., 2015) .
The Living Murray initiative: a first step recognition of environmental needs
Governments and the MDBMC had great difficulty dealing with the growing tension between environmental and irrigation needs. Following a review of the science in 2000, which indicated clearly that current water management practices were not sustainable, governments eventually agreed to look at options under the banner of The Living Murray (TLM), in 2002, designed to provide additional water to six icon sites along the River Murray (MDBA, 2011). In 2003 MDB governments agreed to implement an action plan to purchase 500 GL long-term average annual yield (LTAAY), even in the face of advice that a minimum additional pool of 1,500 GL was needed ( Jones et al., 2002; MDBMC, 2002 MDBMC, , 2003 COAG, 2003) .
Governments agreed to accumulate an environmental water portfolio under the banner of TLM, but then only proceeded very slowly to implement it, even though in 2006 the national government offered to spend an additional AUD$500 million to speed up the purchase (Connell et al., 2005; MDBMC, 2006) . The early post agreement years of TLM illustrated how drought conditions can bring an issue to the fore, but what happens then is determined by an array of factors, including institutional and agricultural politics (Connell, 2002 (Connell, , 2007 Horne, 2016a; Guest, forthcoming) . 
The National Water Initiative
On a parallel course, the persisting drought resulted in a renewed interest in national water reform. In 2003, at the same COAG meeting that discussed funding for TLM, governments agreed to develop a renewed water agenda focusing on implementing nationally compatible water access entitlements that encouraged investment and maximised the economic value created from water use, while ensuring rivers and aquifers remained healthy. The new framework would cover: nationally functioning water markets (an efficient water market enabling increased returns from water use and in the MDB, a review of entitlement products); best practice water pricing (user pays and full cost recovery); integrated management of environmental water (in the MDB, a basin-wide approach to enable environmental water management, including through the market); better measuring, monitoring and information; urban water reform (to reinforce the need for urban users to use water efficiently including by promoting water reuse and recycling); and new institutional monitoring of actions by government, to be undertaken by the National Water Commission (NWC) (COAG, 2003) .
A year later governments agreed a negotiated compact, without any financial inducement, reflecting the worsening water outlook (Connell, 2007; Quiggin, 2007; Horne, 2013a) . The National Water Initiative (NWI) framed the water problem in terms of triple bottom line outcomes, encouraging governments to address issues of overallocation and overuse in irrigation and the pressing water needs of the environment, as well as focusing on efficiency and markets in both urban and rural water use. Climate change was explicitly recognised as an issue of water policy (COAG, 2004; Khan, 2008) .
While there are many analyses of the substance of the NWI and progress in implementation (Connell et al., 2005; Crase, 2011; NWC, 2011) , little is said of the role of drought, which assisted in elevating water policy issues to national political attention, giving it a place on a limited and crowded agenda in eight out of 10 meetings between 2000 and 2006 (COAG, various) .
But state actions agreed under the NWI, as under TLM a few years earlier, were again implemented slowly relative to commitments, resulting in COAG having to 'renew' its commitment to implementation on several occasions (COAG, 2007) . Tardy implementation of these water policy commitments by states was an ongoing reflection of difficult politics, for example deep-seated tension between irrigation and environmental objectives, and of course of the difficult economic conditions being experienced in many regional areas, which were still grappling with ongoing drought.
In a modest way, through TLM, governments were continuing the process of building a small portfolio of water to be set aside for the environment, but it was questionable whether substantial progress was being made, as increases in irrigation efficiency meant less water was being returned to the rivers, and with the growth of markets an increasing percentage of allocation water was being diverted (Loch & Adamson, 2015) . As the drought deepened in 2006, this tension remained unresolved. (Dreverman, 2013) . In October 2006, the NSW government suspended some water allocations in the southern MDB that had already been credited to entitlement holder accounts, an indication that water management in the southern MDB was entering uncharted territory.
2006-08 cooperative dry inflow contingency planning
First Ministers of the national government and MDB state and territory governments attended a 'crisis' meeting called at short notice by the Prime Minister in early November 2006. There were two key outcomes from this meeting. It commissioned the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to prepare a water availability study for the basin as a whole, to provide an up-to-date assessment of water resources in the Basin, and how they were being used. The study would explicitly look at the impact of climate change out to 2030 (Howard, 2006) . This was an outcome with positive long-term consequences, not only in the MDB, but nationally (CSIRO, 2008) .
In the short-term, however, First Ministers were focused very much on ensuring all governments understood the problems at hand, and options to address them. They commissioned a senior officers group (SOG) to provide regular updates on the state of water resources in the southern MDB, and to recommend actions that went beyond the business as usual framework provided by the Murray-Darling Agreement (Howard, 2006) .
The guiding principle for 'dry inflow contingency planning' was that where possible the operation of the market should be maintained, but if existing systems and rules failed, 'urban areas and towns should be provided sufficient survival water' (SOG, 2006) . The focus of planning and policy actions was to secure urban supplies during 2007 and beyond, but also to ensure available water beyond urban provision was used to best effect. Initial scenario planning indicated that if inflows continued on their trajectory, critical demands could not be met for the River Murray (SOG, 2006) . Previous assumptions about worst-case inflows based on the historical record were re-examined, as the basis for them proved to be hopelessly optimistic (Dreverman, 2013) . This was a wake-up call on stationarity suggesting planning needed to be forward looking rather than anchored in history (Milly et al., 2008; Quiggin et al., 2010) .
The nine reports from the SOG over a 2-year period set out immediate actions, actions that needed further consideration and actions that should be avoided (SOG, 2007-9) . Many of these intergovernmental planning and policy discussions took place in circumstances where scenario planning suggested that there was a substantial risk that even 'critical human water needs' (CHWN) (a new term coined at the time) may not be met, which would have meant a collapse of irrigation in the southern part of the MDB.
Contingency planning continued for nearly 2 years, in parallel with major reforms being developed by the national government independently and in concert with state and territory governments, and developments being progressed by state governments individually. This period of extreme drought provided significant action and lessons on water policy, including strengthening of the water governance framework in the MDB.
Governments agreed that in managing issues around dry inflow contingency planning, markets should be used to the maximum extent possible (Howard, 2007b) . There was an enhanced realisation that a fully functioning market required careful specification of all rights as far as possible, hence the development of policy around CHWN and carryover.
The 2008 amendments to the Water Act 2007 (discussed below) included formal arrangements to manage water sharing for CHWN being made a part of the MDB Basin Plan (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) . This policy development can be directly attributable to the 2006-07 dry inflow contingency experiences.
The nine SOG reports going to First Ministers over a 2-year period gives some sense of the depth of the crisis in the southern MDB, and the time that governments at the national and state level were required to set aside for its consideration. Overall, short-term policy responses had some positive impact on improving the management of the very small stock of available water (Dreverman, 2013; Ballard et al., 2014) . But some of these policy measures, notably carryover and water trading, had a much longer-term positive impact by encouraging policymakers and water users to place more emphasis on risk management within water years and between them, and for rights to be specified more clearly. The transition of carryover policy in each state from a drought response to a permanent feature of managing water allocations is illustrative of this (National Water Commission, 2014) .
Combined with broader national deliberations related to the drafting of the national Water Bill and new water governance arrangements for the MDB, these developments give some sense of the direct policy focus brought about by the drought, and the long-term outcomes from it.
The National Plan for Water Security and the Water Act 2007
The Howard government's 2007 National Plan for Water Security (NPWS) (subsequently rebadged and fine-tuned under the Rudd government, as Water for the Future) had significant long-term intent. Rather than simply responding to acute but short-term issues brought into focus by the drought, it incorporated long-term policy and political responses made possible by the drought (Howard, 2007a; Wong, 2008; Horne, 2013a) .
The major initiatives that formed the core of this well-resourced 10-year national thrust into MDB water governance and management included the following:
• Commissioning the long-term basin-wide water availability study noted above, and replicating it in three other areas where water resource use was under the microscope (CSIRO, 2013).
• Establishing the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), a new independent national institution to oversee water management in the MDB (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008).
• Putting in place a Basin Plan, including establishing mandatory requirements for catchment level water planning for all water resources under a sustainable diversion limit (SDL), rather than just surface water, a basin-wide environmental watering plan, and regulations and rules to strengthen the operation of the water markets within the MDB (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012; Horne, 2014; Hart, 2015a Hart, , 2015b ).
• Giving the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission a key role in overseeing irrigation infrastructure operators, monitoring and enforcing MDB water market rules, and making recommendations to the MDBA on water trading rules (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), 2016).
• Establishing the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder, an environmental water holder with a strong basin-wide perspective, and an operating philosophy of developing close cooperation with states and communities (Docker & Robinson, 2013; Banks & Docker, 2014 ).
• Substantially increasing the volume of water entitlements set aside for the environment, to halt the decline in environmental outcomes, through national government entitlement purchases in the water market, and through investments in infrastructure (Australian Government, 2016).
• Providing better, more water transparent information to facilitate improved decision making and risk management by water users and policy decision-makers (Vertessy, 2013; Horne, 2015a; Bureau of Meteorology, 2016b) . These initiatives formed the basis for policy implementation over the period beyond 2009, well after the crisis had passed. The Water Act for its part put to bed once and for all the notion that water was simply the responsibility of the states, and it has become very much a shared responsibility between national government and the states, in conjunction with the community (Briese et al., 2009; Kildea & Williams, 2010) .
Putting drought into perspective
The scale of new action foreshadowed under NPWS/Water for the Future and the Water Act showed that as far as Australia had come during the decade to end 2006, much further work was needed over the following decade. Drought provided the central impetus or crisis for these initiatives to get started. An October 2005 public opinion poll ranked water as the most important issue for the national government to become more involved in (Roy Morgan Research, 2005) . Three other factors were also important. These were:
• political leadership in the form of a national government led by an established long-serving Prime Minister, bolstered by an activist parliamentary secretary (later to become Water Minister and Prime Minister), combined with bipartisan political support at the national level;
• a game changing strategy (Christensen, 2013) in the form of a national Water Act seeking more determined water governance action across a spectrum of key water issues; and
• a strong national budgetary position making it easier to earmark the significant level of resourcing required to make a substantial difference.
Up to the end of 2006, the national government had played a subsidiary role to the states in managing water issues, although it had played important facilitating roles through the previous 100 years as successive River Murray and Murray-Darling Agreements were put in place (Clark, 1971; Kildea & Williams, 2010; Guest, forthcoming) . In particular, the national government played an instrumental role in funding and putting in place the Snowy Mountain Scheme, and other major construction projects during the development phase in the MDB, and in the 1995 COAG Water Reforms, which sought to arrest the decline in the environment, and put a greater focus on recognising the value of the water resources. The 2004 NWI framework agreement again exhorted states to take action across many fronts but progress was slow. By 2007, with water shortages reaching crisis point not only in the MDB, but in key urban areas also, the national government moved decisively to become more involved, reflecting its view that state inaction was hurting the MDB regional economy, the environment and communities. Most, but not all states welcomed this approach. The Victorian state government in particular and from the outset steadfastly argued against much of what the national government sought to do, resulting in the Water Act 2007 being national legislation, based on the national government's own constitutional powers, including its external affairs power (its obligations in relation to biodiversity, Ramsar wetlands and migratory birds), its corporations power (in relation to regulation of market activities, and interstate trade of water entitlements) and powers relating to meteorological observations and census and statistics (Horne, 2007; Briese et al., 2009) . A change of national government in late 2007, bringing alignment between the political persuasion of national and Victorian government saw the legislation being revisited, and some modifications made, including importantly referral of some state powers to the national government (Briese et al., 2009) . But the thrust remained the same: the institutional framework and the thrust of water policy in the MDB had been changed decisively. Drought was necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reforms proceeding. Political will across the spectrum of views at the national level, constitutional powers, and resources provided the package of conditions needed to proceed.
Water markets and water trading through the drought
The MDB water markets account for over 95% of all water trading in Australia, and are the world's largest. The central, very well established notion behind the water market and water trading policies is that they enable water to migrate to higher value uses, and encourage more efficient use. However, as is also well recognised, their use has been contentious to some, and their development drawn out over a substantial period of time (NWC, 2011; Grafton & Horne, 2014; Wheeler, 2014; Grafton, et al., 2015) . The Millennium drought, and the period after the drought, saw the MDB's water markets coming of age, and in the process put to bed many of the myths about negative impacts of water market operations when there are sound governance arrangements in place . Figures 3 and 4 show the growth of both entitlement water trading (effectively buying and selling a share of the consumptive pool) and allocation water trading (effectively buying access to a specific volume of water in a specific water year) through the drought, and its continuation even after the drought had broken.
For governments, the development in the water markets during the drought years focused on strengthening property rights and removing differences between state systems that made trading difficult, particularly in entitlements. This was possible because the parties involved could see the benefits, notwithstanding specific issues. For irrigation infrastructure operators, there were issues around the impact of trading and their business models (ACCC, 2010). For irrigators, there was much to assimilate about how the markets operated, and how they could contribute to business profitability. Even in recent years, information availability continues to improve, as do options for participating in water trading (Schirmer et al., 2015) . Improvements in settlement times are another positive development (Morey et al., 2015) . There were also issues around integrating environmental water portfolios based on entitlements previously owned by irrigators, but purchased by the national government in the market. Consistent rules were needed that respected hydrology but also applied to basin-wide trading.
The increased acceptance and use of water markets can in large part be attributed to the drought creating irrigator demands for change. The extended and deep drought placed pressure on irrigators to reconsider how they did business, and how they worked their assets. The value and cost of water became very apparent and central. But it took concerted effort to break administrative logjams and reduce transaction costs, to put in place new approaches and to test new trading models. Political scrutiny increased, and state and national institutions increased efforts to resolve ongoing problems, such as those around interstate trading and the level of transaction costs (Australian Government, 2008; COAG Standing Council on Environment and Water, 2013) . The concept of water having value was and is very well accepted, so much so that 'water trading has become a vital business tool for many irrigators, providing flexibility to respond to variable water availability' (MDBA, 2016a). Water moved from being a silent part of balance sheets and input costs, to a very active part.
The benefit from well-functioning water markets is assessed in numerous studies. Wheeler summarises eight of these, concluding the economic benefits have been considerable (Wheeler, 2014) . Another study notes inter alia the contribution of markets and trading to reducing risks and uncertainty ; one survey reports the positive contribution of water trading to irrigator well-being in a non-drought year (Schirmer et al., 2015) . This seems likely to suggest greater peace of mind to MDB households and communities in managing drought. Another study suggests that irrigator adaption through the drought years resulted in a two-thirds reduction in water being associated with only a 20% decline in irrigated production gross value. Irrigators employed many drought adaption strategies (including crop mix, source of inputs and water trading) (Kirby et al., 2014) .
Integration of carryover policy into water market infrastructure
A less discussed but important example of water market development during the Millennium drought relates to carryover policy. Over a 10-year period, carryover policy went from being a drought contingency measure in some regions to a widely accepted part of the mainstream water allocation market.
As benefits of carryover became appreciated, it became an important tool for providing additional flexibility in using water assets, to all water users, with each state eventually introducing permanent carryover rules, and upstream states (NSW and Victoria) agreeing to the downstream state (South Australia) being allocated storage rights in upstream dams (NWC, 2011; Ballard et al., 2014) . Policy development resulted in better managing risks from extreme events that had implications for normal market operations. In a real sense, carryover policy represented a movement of risk management from government to the entitlement and allocation water owner. Subsequent flooding events laid bare some weaknesses in the new carryover policies, particularly in Victoria, suggesting this is one area where future refinements might be expected (Hughes et al., 2013; Department of Environment and Primary Industries, 2016) .
Figures 5 and 6 provide a metric for the significance of this policy development in the southern MDB. Over 25% of available water is now regularly carried over.
National competition policy and markets
The injection of national competition policy oversight in 2007 increased competition within the MDB water market, allowing irrigators to make choices involving buying and selling water entitlements and allocations in a friendlier, more neutral environment, without threats and in cases unconscionable action from irrigation infrastructure operators. These businesses themselves had to adjust how they did business as the needs and wants of their irrigators changed, and as the regulatory framework became much more transparent and monitoring more demanding (ACCC, 2010).
Information and markets
The quality of information available to water users was given a massive boost under the Water for the Future banner, by a water information programme led by the BOM to boost the quality and timeliness of water information. New systems had to be put in place, and irrigators and others had to learn how to use this information and integrate it into their businesses in the midst of drought (Morey et al., 2015) . Ten years later, this is having positive benefits throughout the water sector, assisting irrigators, urban water service providers, environmental water managers and policymakers better manage risks related to water in the immediate future and in the medium term (The Centre for International Economics, 2015; Bureau of Meteorology, 2016b). It has made much more transparent, information that was previously either not widely available or not available at all. Having implemented the programme and established its worth, the issue was whether its 10-year funding would be renewed in 2017. In the absence of a crisis and with a straitened national fiscal environment, the programme's future is uncertain.
In some parts of the MDB economic pressure on communities was enormous, as not only was a drought in progress, but commodity prices were falling and the exchange rate was rising. Part of the successful development of water markets can also be attributable to the decline in transaction costs as governments and the private sector improved their use of internet-based trading programmes. Taken together these developments, and a gradual increase in actual experience in the markets, altered significantly market participant perceptions around intrinsic value. None of this was instantaneous, but required persistent effort, and the building of market infrastructure to deliver positive outcomes from water trading. Concerns by some that water might move out of agriculture, or that some regions might be adversely affected have proved groundless. Research suggests water trading contributed substantially to regional domestic product or substantially ameliorated the effects of reduced water availability on irrigation output (National Water Commission, 2012; Kirby et al., 2014) .
Overall, as the drought unfolded irrigators were actioning on their own volition what economic studies later made clear, that the benefits from water trading were considerable (Mallawaarachchi & Foster, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2010; Wheeler, 2014; Grafton et al., 2015) . Simply put, markets enabled users to better manage scarcity (Young, 2013) , and policy change enabled this behaviour.
Drought impact on urban and regional communities
One concern often expressed is that water trading would lead to increased water transfer to urban areas. While economically efficient, political concern and action during the drought years limited this occurrence. A 'north-south' pipeline to add to Melbourne's water security costing $750 m was to provide 75 GL of water, effectively subsidising irrigation modernisation in northern Victoria. For political reasons the water designated for Melbourne consumption (Melbourne is outside the MDB) has never been used there. The Victorian government's current policy introduced after the decision to build the pipeline is to only use the pipeline in a CHWN emergency (Productivity Commission, 2011) .
In contrast, two pipelines (of 47 km and 87 km length, with an aggregate capacity of 38 GL) were constructed to increase water availability for two Victorian regional urban centres of 80,000, which had nearly exhausted their available supplies (Victorian Auditor General, 2008) . No political opposition was raised on this occasion. Here the quantity of water involved in the context of overall water resources was very small (one centre had budgeted to purchase an additional 5 GL of entitlements), and the pipelines significantly enhanced water security to the two regional centres.
Some further constraints on water market activity (for example, a Victorian policy rule limiting entitlement trade out of an irrigation district to 4% annually) lasted for political reasons well past its use by date (Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) & NWC, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2010) . Politics, driven by a state-based farmers' group, kept in place a policy position that without doubt was damaging the welfare of many Victorian irrigators. Most of these state-based constraints have now been eliminated, in the MDB at least, by national rules.
The north-south pipe use rule and the 4% rule involved political decisions, and little attention to NWI principles. Moreover, a key element of government responses to drought affecting urban areas in Australia as a whole, and in areas that might draw on the MDB, was to invest heavily and, in part, unwisely in overly large urban desalination plants and in water reuse plants. This was accompanied by very large increases in the price of urban water. Despite it being inefficient, this policy approach increased urban water security in Adelaide and Melbourne, and took much pressure off water transfers from rural to urban areas. Drought also saw much greater attention being given to a range of demand management policies in major urban areas, again increasing long-term water security, and embedding a stronger appreciation of the value of water (Horne, 2016b) .
Investments in infrastructure to increase efficiency of water use
Increasing efficiency of water use through investments in infrastructure has been a feature of increasing awareness of the value of water and acknowledging ever-present issues of water security in the face of drought and potentially longer-term climate change impacts. Significant public funding (many billions of dollars) was provided to drive this process. The funds underpinned irrigation renewal, community and regional projects to pipe previously open channels, and infrastructure to deliver environmental outcomes using less water (Victorian Auditor General, 2008; Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), 2010 , 2012 . Generally speaking, using public funding in this way has been heavily criticised (for example, Grafton, 2010; Loch & Adamson, 2015) , but it is salutary to consider whether the thrust of reform would have proceeded without subsidising the private irrigation and community projects to increase water use efficiency. This author considers it is very problematic: in a sense these projects result from groups of private individuals and communities using the political process to reduce transition costs. Droughts provide a vehicle where the difficulties of these businesses and communities are most apparent. Policy action reflected this strongly political dimension. One such infrastructure project underscores the limitation of general rules such as the NWI pricing principles (Department of the Environment, 2010), and project assessment of large projects that offer water savings for the environment in return for capital funding. The Wimmera-Mallee water pipeline was a huge project: 17,500 km of open earthen channels replaced by an 8,800 km piped water distribution system. The new system covers 10% of Victoria. It provides water to 2,500 rural customers, 35,000 urban customers and 36 towns in the region (Victorian Auditor General, 2008) . The $688 m project was over 75% funded by national and state governments, with a very small payback of environmental water, very little of which has been delivered. To regional communities, it provided much enhanced water security, but a more critical analysis suggests it never had any hope of passing any accepted benefit/cost test for public infrastructure, nor did it meet NWI pricing principles. Politics determined that it should be built.
Policies toward environmental water
The Millennium drought brought into sharp focus the damage being done to the environment. By late 2006 an environmental crisis was beginning to unfold in the Coorong and the Lower Lakes, the end point of the MDB. The Basin had effectively become a closed system, and salinity levels in the Lower Lakes had risen dramatically. As discussed above, MDB dry inflow contingency planning was focusing first and foremost on CHWN, and provided few avenues to provide any additional environmental water flows. It was clear by this stage, following a series of dry years, that Basin planning under the MDBC aegis had either underestimated system variability or that climate change was playing a role, which planning was not addressing. Later it became clear that state decisions about the use of water shares favoured irrigators over the environment . In the short to medium term it mattered little because there was not enough water to worry about anything but CHWN. But in the longer term it was significant.
Notwithstanding TLM had earlier been put in place as a first step to address declining environmental outcomes, the national government's Water for the Future provided resourcing for direct purchases from the Basin water markets of around 1,500 GL LTAAY of entitlements (or around 14% of MDB surface water extractions LTAAY), and funds to accumulate entitlements through on and off farm infrastructure investments (Horne, 2013b) . Governance arrangements were established for this pool of environmental water to be managed by independent professionals within the national government, with close cooperative arrangements with state and local bodies (Docker & Robinson, 2013; Banks & Docker, 2014) . State governments also established their own environmental water holders on a much smaller scale. For the first time, on a large scale, the environment would have access to water flows in its own right. The drought brought the plight of the environment to a head, but a crisis was required to generate new governance arrangements and funding programmes. These actions are, perhaps, helping to bring the MDB back from irreversible ecosystem decline, but some questioned whether the agreed volumes that were to be set aside would be sufficient to do that Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, 2012) .
After the dry: what happened?
The course of events after the Millennium drought broke in the MDB in 2010 provides some insight into how drought affected the development and implementation of water policy.
State governments continued to transform their water planning arrangements and their web-based water trading regimes, at least in the MDB. While national government spending on infrastructure in the MDB continued apace, state government general and financial commitment to joint operations in the MDB declined substantially (MDBA, 2015b) .
From a national perspective, the MDB Basin Plan and the growth and use of environmental water portfolios stand out.
The national government put in place the first MDB plan at the end of 2012, cementing in place a key water planning document for the MDB, but really starting a process of further reforms that would take until 2019 to implement (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012; Hart, 2015b; Horne, 2015b; Pittock et al., 2015; MDBA, 2016a) . The plan was a product of extensive consultation with communities, and considerable interest group and state government pressure to dilute the timing and impact of the plan, in part reflecting the dissipating impact of the drought. Despite these concerns the plan represented a major step forward in putting in place a sustainable water resource management framework in the MDB. The new institutional arrangements, involving the MDBA, have been well bedded down, and the MDB water market rules are in place. But in the absence of drought or another crisis, two key, yet to be implemented, initiatives in the Basin Plan will test governments. The first is the new SDLs that govern the balance between irrigated diversions and water being set aside for the environment (Horne, 2015b; MDBA, 2016b) . Before they are implemented, voices of opposition are likely to become louder, as evidenced by a recent parliamentary inquiry (Parliament of Australia, 2015) .
The second is the related SDL adjustment mechanism. It is proposed that selected water efficiency projects in irrigation and environment could be used to reduce or increase the overall SDL limits respectively (MDBA, 2015a). The mechanism is currently being trialled. The robustness of projects selected under this mechanism will enable observers to tease out much more fully the extent to which governments remain committed to reform processes. The adjustment mechanism was at least in part an element of the compromise with the states to secure their support for the Basin Plan SDLs. Drought per se has nothing to do with the mechanism, but the issue of scarcity is at its core. In a design sense, states' interests are keen to increase the SDL as far as possible, so it will come as no surprise if proposed projects focus on increasing the efficiency of environmental watering.
By 2016 the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder's portfolio of MDB environmental water entitlements had reached 1,600 GL LTAAY, larger than the TLM and all state environmental water portfolios combined. It accounted for flows of over 4,200 GL over 4 years, or about 10% of water diverted under the cap over this period. Annual basin wide environmental water plans had been put in place for the first time, and were now a part of established practice.
Summary and conclusion
Drought plays a significant role in the Australian landscape. By the early 1990s the limits on water use became increasingly apparent as the ecological health of key Australian catchments, including in the MDB, declined. Whereas the response to scarcity in the 1960s and 1970s had been largely to address supply, including building more dams, by the mid-1990s a new approach was beginning to take hold. It recognised that water was a scarce resource, and that the management paradigm needed to reflect it. Understanding the value of water was required if agricultural output was to continue to expand, and if ecological outcomes were not to be further compromised. National and state governments accepted these core notions, and began a long process of putting in place supportive water governance arrangements, including separating surface water rights from land rights, and in the MDB, capping water use and strengthening the operation of markets.
The Millennium drought brought a much sharper focus to discussions of scarcity and value of water, in irrigation districts and urban areas, and towards the environment. In addition to slowly implementing changes in water governance arising from policy changes that preceded the Millennium drought, the drought initially focused attention on rising salinity and environmental water availability, as action on both was supported by strong science and resonated politically. As the drought continued, nationally agreed reform attracted renewed attention because earlier efforts remained unfinished. The NWI was agreed and well regarded, including for its recognition of the risks from climate change. But implementation of reform continued slowly.
The most severe phase of drought brought concerted action. In the short term, the key issue was how to make sure communities did not run out of water. For the longer term, the national government responded with a 'big bang' package, which would only have been politically possible in an extreme drought. Over time, it gained uneasy community support across the MDB. The package strengthened many elements of MDB water governance infrastructure -including new legislation, new institutions, enhanced water resource planning and regulatory oversight, enhanced transparency and upgraded information systems and greater community involvement. Its completeness as a package can be attributed not only to the severity of drought, but also to political leadership, a disrupting strategy in the form of national legislation, and a strong national budget that provided resources. The drought provided a crisis, but other ingredients were necessary to ensure effective action.
Governance reforms over the past decade stand out in the overall sweep of reform in the MDB over the past 100 years, with the national government and communities playing much more central roles than previously, alongside state governments whose roles were, while still very important, much more shared. As noted above, with the Millennium drought having receded, agricultural interests are voicing concerns with some elements of the Basin Plan that affect their interests. Whether the reforms will be fully sustained will be an issue to watch over coming years.
